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James A. Anderson
As the study and development of learning objects evolves, evaluation can and should play a critical role in helping users refine their criteria for such objects and their ability to use disciplined inquiry to improve instruction using learning objects.  (Williams, 2000)

Evaluation can proceed only from some standpoint that defines the character of the learning object, the methodology of its evaluation, and our common agreement to both.  It is this agreement that constitutes the discipline of inquiry.  The methods, bright and dark, that impose that discipline are our topic. 

	There must have been something about the graduate schools of the late 1950s and early 1960s that led to that era’s publication of two works that liberated epistemology from overwhelming success of 18th century science.  The two I have I mind, both published in the second half of the 1960s, were Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality.  
	What Kuhn did was allow us to see science as a sociological phenomenon marked by coalitions of belief and practice.  His work lead to a whole series of demystifications, including Latour’s (1987) work on decontextualized truth and Prelli’s (1989) insight to the rhetoric of science.  What Berger and Luckmann did in their treatise on knowledge was to fully undermine the unequivocality of what is claimed as knowledge.  Their work, in its part, lead to Roth’s (1987) epistemological pluralism that joined the postmodern crusade of knowledge as ideology.  
	What we surrendered in this turmoil was the certainty of truth and the unity of knowledge.  What we gained was a veridical diversity that empowered a multitude of voices in the classroom and its attendant halls of knowledge.  This diversity may be, in the long run, better for the species.  It raises the hope that we won’t be trapped like a bee in an upside down bottle.  The bee’s straight ahead certainty that up is out keeps forcing it to the sealed bottom and its ultimate doom.  It is one of the crazy ideas flitting about like the fly that will eventually find the exit.  
	In the short run, however, we are forced to recognize that knowledge is not transcendental but rather locally produced and that knowledge is not forever but rather sustained in a community of practitioners (that may be world-wide in its distribution).  As Kuhn pointed out, these communities are ideological structures held together and marked apart by certain core beliefs about the world, about the character of our knowledge of the world, and about the nature of the evidence of that knowledge.  Inside one of these communities, truth is often certain and knowledge one.  Members face “culture shock” when they cross the town boundaries to discover that there are real people with power who don’t believe as they do.  
	The typical classroom functions as an ideological community albeit limited in time and scope.  The coercive control exerted by the societally enforced grant of authority and hierarchical structure of instruction can ensure that in this classroom X and only X is the right answer.  Alas, next door and down the hall Y and Z are being similarly enforced.  The threat of this diversity is quite real to the modernist mind and much of the internecine warfare of the academy conducted under the cover of the “quality of the work” is the result .  Most student don’t involve themselves in these battles.   Students simply adopt a “when in Rome” pragmatism and a six weeks memory span.  
Epistemological Communities
	But even in chaos there are patterns and these patterns draw the broad outlines of the territories occupied by different epistemological communities.  Each community has a manifest destiny defined by the natural barriers of its core values.  
Traditions 
	Let’s begin our exploration of these communities by first envisioning knowledge from the traditional view (adapted from Anderson, 1996).  This view, as presented in Figure One, shows knowledge as a central unity in a wide field of


                    Figure One                             
epistemological endeavor located in a broader field of ignorance, folklore, superstition, and common sense.  The boundary of the greater circle defines the right practices and credentials of practitioners, arguments, evidence, claims, and proofs.  Lines leading to the core are the legitimate (or legitimated) avenues of contribution.  Contributions move into the central core as they pass certain tests (of time, elegance, parsimony, logic, coherence, instrumentality, and the like)
	In the pre-Kuhnian era, these boundaries, avenues and tests were presumed to be foundational—natural if you will—given by the empirical world, the only legitimate object of true knowledge.  Now, of course, they are recognized by some as ideological, given in the sociological practices of local knowledge production.  
Traditional Divisions
	One cannot go on reading the map of Figure One for long without noticing that its representation does not correspond well with what seems to be the territory.  There are some prominent features not represented.  Figure Two starts the clarification by sectioning the grand circle into quadrants.  The quadrants are headed by conceptual boundaries that effectively divide the membership.  The four
                           Figure Two
 concepts in their paired opposites are methodological individualism/ methodological holism, and foundationalism/reflexivity.  We’ll spend a little time exploring the character and functions of these conceptual boundaries.
Methodological Individualism--Methodological Holism
	The shared term of methodology in this pair makes use of the philosophical meaning for methodology as a foundational practice of knowledge production.  An epistemological method identified by individualism holds the world to be divisible and reducible to a finite (and small) number of fundamental building blocks—all matter is composed of molecules, all molecules of atoms, all atoms of particles; the human self is a product of, say, a value structure, intelligence, and personality which themselves are constellations of attitudes, aptitudes and traits. 
	A holist epistemology focuses on unities rather than parts.  In a unity, elements come together in a way that alters them.  It is this alteration in the combined state that creates the unity.  If one is to know a self, a particular material, a society, a culture, one must study it as a whole, not as a set of components.  One cannot predict a sentence by studying a dictionary.  And to jump ideologies, a human individual is not a set of scores; a human has a soul.  
	Methodological individualism is dominant in physics and chemistry and their dominance extends its sway across the other physical sciences, although holism does show up in some factions of the biological.  Methodological holism finds its strongest expression in the realms of sentience and semiosis—those fields that study the sign, the mind, and understanding.  Boundary battles are evidenced in the fields where arguments over metric (quantitative) and hermeneutic (qualitative) research methodologies regularly occur, such as anthropology, education, psychology, sociology and communication.  Boundary battles also show up in Institutional Review Boards that authorize all human subject research in universities, in the social arguments about the humane treatment of research animals, and even in the wilderness debates.
Foundationalism--Reflexivity
	Our methodology pair broke across the direction of analysis –bottom up or top down.  This pair breaks first across the final resting place of the argument—on a secure foundation either of authority or of an independent, empirical world or on a constructed standpoint dependent on the political strength of its practitioners.  It is the validity difference between “It is a scientific law because it is true” and “It is true because it is a scientific law,” and the instrumental difference between “It works because it is true” and “It’s true because it works.”  
	The first of those two contrasts considers whether the validity of an argument is independent of the methods used to arrive at the conclusions.  Is the Oedipus Complex valid without Freudianism?  The second considers whether knowledge production can ever be free of purpose.  Does personality testing work because of the existence of personality or does personality exist because personality testing serves some disciplinary or social purpose?  Similarly modern atomic theory can be said to exist because the purposes of World War II provided the enormous funding to make it possible.
	The second break for this pair is across the independence of the observer, the observation, and the observed.  In foundational epistemology, all three are independent of one another.  Done properly, local conditions, practices, and agents should not affect the evidence generated.  The evidence is said to be transcendent.  Claims can move across time and place.  In reflexive epistemologies, the evidence is always a function of local conditions, practices, and agents.  It is said to be historicized.  Claims are limited to the who, when, where, why and how of the evidence production.  The result is that we can teach Newtonian physics in a start of the 21st century introductory class pretty much the same as it would have been taught in the start of 20th century without much comment, but all hell would break loose if we did the same in social studies.  
	Now for some the conclusion is that social studies is not true knowledge, just a hodge podge of current common sense.  For others, the conclusion is that knowledge claims about the social are time-bound in ways that claims about the material are not.  And for yet others the conclusion turns to the question of why doesn’t all hell break loose if we are still teaching Newtonian physics.  The first of these is a foundational conclusion, the second two are reflexive.
	From an epistemologist’s point of view, reflexivity changes things in interesting ways.  The object of our science now participates in the science itself and even works to undercut the scientific conclusion.  For example, the strategies and tactics of The 60-second Manager by Blanchard was followed within 6 months by The 59-second Employee by Andre and Ward.  Both of these books have gone through multiple editions.  The knowledge of one set of claims is subverted by the other. 
	Reflexivity also changes the ethical requirements of knowledge.  In traditional epistemology, true trumps good.  The claim of what is can never be modified by what ought to be (what is right and proper).  In reflexive epistemology, some value will accrue to someone every time an advanced claim is declared true.  That someone always includes the scientist/scholar/critic both locally and institutionally and the larger social purposes that empower the scientist/scholar/critic.  It is true because it ought (is right and proper) to be true.  The conclusion is that advancing claim—any claim—is in the scientist’s self-interest.  The scientist, therefore, becomes responsible for the consequences of the claim.  So, if collecting demographic information on surveys serves to promote racism, the scientist is a racist even if inadvertently.  It suddenly becomes a tough game to play.  
Community Memberships
	Epistemological communities become functional when they are populated by practitioners of knowledge work.  Figure Three presents the general membership patterns that appear within the quadrants formed by the axis of validity and method.  
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In common terms, the “hard” sciences and definitive arts (strict representation, perhaps) occupy the quadrant bounded by foundationalism and methodological individualism; the metric arts (architecture & graphics) and social sciences slide toward reflexivity while maintaining individualism as a method; the interpretive arts and social sciences (branches of psychology and sociology, cultural studies, ethnography) cross to methodological holism and in the foundational/holistic quadrant are the authority-based arts and sciences (perhaps much of ethics, law, journalism).  
	Each of these communities create their own emblems of membership, barriers to entry, scriptural texts, citizenship requirements and judicial practices of enforcement.  These elements translate into the cultural means of knowledge production that in turn define production practices and the character of the resultant product.  Where you belong makes a difference in what you can say and how you can say it.  
	An emblem shared by all is being inside the circle meaning that they are culturally recognized to nominate some class of claim as true.  Those outside the circle are generally denied that right.  Being inside the circle is faint recognition, however, when being viewed across the quadrant axes.  Quadrant membership requires particular personal and institutional credentials.  
	It is these credentials, among other things, that create the barriers to entry into membership and constitute the scriptures of membership.  Being a member requires that you have achieved certain levels of accomplishment, know certain things, have a certain perspective, understand what questions can be asked and the nature of the right answer.  There is little that is egalitarian about epistemology.  
	Achieving entry and scriptural immersion are socialization processes that imprint the right practices of knowledge production—the behavior of the good quadrant citizen.  We see that imprinting in the character of the scholarship—the methods of evidence production, the warrants of claim, the backing that supports it, and the discursive forms in which it is presented.  The scholarship of physics is different from the scholarship of cultural studies because of the different sociological practices that support each of these.  And when those practices are not sustained, rigorous practice of enforcement come into play to make things right again.  
	Kuhn was pointing to these sociological practices in The Scientific Revolution.  These practices create the boundaries of his famous, if ill-understood, paradigms of science.  Paradigmatic science or epistemology is highly conventionalized, which means that members are readily identifiable and the rules of performance are well-developed, codified, reproduced, and enforced.  
	It would be a sweet turn to argue that each of our quadrants was paradigmatic.  But, as Figure Four shows, only the covering law arts and sciences 
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have achieved that level of integration.  Further, I suspect that the requirements and limitations of reflexivity would prevent that whole hemi-sphere from achieving the needed integration.  Each time the members would get close to that accomplishment, the practices themselves would become the object of analysis, thereby deconstructing the whole project.  
	Paradigmatic integration, however, does not mean intra-quadrant homogeneity.  There is substantial within-membership variability as the quadrant divides across disciplines, sub-disciplines and interests.  The American Physical Society, for example lists 13 different divisions for the field of physics.  (Communication on the reflexive side has more than 4 times that number of divisions.)
               Figure Five
As Figure Five shows, a paradigmatic field splits into disciplinary domains.  Disciplinary members claim ownership of certain types of claim and vigorously defend their rights of title.  Utah’s cold fusion episode was as much a row over chemists making claims about the behavior of atoms as it was about bad science.  The fight was both interdisciplinary and paradigmatic.  
	We have come a long way from our initial representation of human knowledge and its production as an  unbroken circle of practitioners with defined avenues of contribution to a unified center of valid claim.  I have now redrawn that image in Figure Six in a much more realistic form (given the third quadrant perspective from
                               Figure Six
 which I write).  That figure shows  knowledge boxed in paradigmatic and pseudo-paradigmatic memberships, divided by disciplines whose members are content with and fiercely defend their own slice of the pie.  
Implications for Learning Objects
	David Wiley of this volume defines a Learning Object as “any digital resource which can be reused to mediate learning” (http://wiley.ed.usu.edu/pres/oln.pdf (​http:​/​​/​wiley.ed.usu.edu​/​pres​/​oln.pdf​); accessed May 19, 2003).  Wiley’s definition, as useful as it is, glosses two very important social processes both of which are embedded in plural character of knowledge.  The first of these is how any collection of zeros and ones gets nominated, authenticated, accepted, and utilized as a resource in the performances of authorized instruction.  The second is in the mediation of learning.  It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to finely detail these processes but a few salient points can be made.
Resource Nomination, Authentication, Acceptance, and Utilization
	Nominating something as a resource for learning is the same as making a claim for knowledge that is embodied or represented in the resource.  The object remains locatable in the epistemological domain of its creation and it carries the assumptive codes of that location.  Those codes are the source of its coherence as an object.  One can strip away a contextualizing framework (a problem in itself) but not this internal coherence.   Knowledge, as we have seen, is both plural and contestable.  As creationists and evolutionists so clearly demonstrate, epistemology is not a bloodless sport.  Where something comes from marks its value in other locations. 
	Authentication identifies the object as a “learning object”—an object qualified to be used in authorized instruction.  While this process may be local even to the individual decision maker, it is subject to review by agents of the authorizing instructional institution.  But more likely the move to qualify the object will be substantially more than local.  It will be conventionalized and institutionalized in archives and rules of access.  Meta classification, for example, is part of the authenticating process.  Classification systems and the larger authentication process are neither ideologically nor politically neutral.  They are, however, reductive, which means that whole interest areas can be wiped out.
	The instructor who moves a learning object into a field of authorized instruction performs an act of acceptance of the object and its qualities that will mark her or his own instructional performance.  Our current, carbon-based system of learning objects (textbooks and the like) is a highly limited and limiting resource.  But it does lower the risks entailed by the user.  Order any multi-edition textbook for a standardized course and the results are going to be pretty much the same.  Assemble a course out of learning objects and the risks of failure and being branded by that failure are pretty high.  Learning objects grant freedom but not autonomy.  They grant the right to choose but not the right to judge.  It is the right of others (such as an instructor in a classroom) to judge that makes freedom risky.  
	Utilization is the last topic of this section   Our discussion on utilization begins with the problem alluded to earlier about the decontextualization and recontextualization of the internal coherence of a learning object.  It is a problem that I am most familiar with in the utilization of ethnographic narratives or field notes as evidence in an ethnographic argument.  Consider this snippet taken from a long-form interview on relationships:
So about 1:00 I go to work I get on the computer and I check my e-mails and there is one from her and it is from between 11:30 and 1:00. It's like a three page e-mail; real in depth about how she can't be in a serious relationship right now; how so much is going on an her life; and I'm thinking where is this coming from?  We aren't dating.  We have been broken up for about two months now.  I'm thinking come on, you can't do this to me again.  And then it goes on to negate everything, saying,  "I really like a hanging out with you.  I love being together and love your family and maybe we can hang out."  She wants to keep me in Limbo.  I feel like I was always being placed a hook.  (NR 69)
	The internal coherence of this selection is so strong that although it is only 9 lines out of pages, we know the story being told and can immediately form conceptions of the actors and the paradigmatic action in play.  But think with me how these lines might be used in a feminist argument on romantic love, in a discussion of relational ethics, in an interpersonal communication class, in a class on the sociology of dating, in a psychology class on double-bind relationships.  
	The lines would work wonderfully in each, but each case would radically recontextualize them to accomplish its own purposes.  And isn’t that the point of having learning objects in the first place?  The critic of the ethnographic argument would call this “poaching”—the opportunistic selection of material that supports some claim.  The user of learning objects is not typically under the restrictions of good ethnographic practice, but at some point the integrity of the learning object can be challenged.  
	Consider that the intrinsic value of these lines is that they are real.  They were really spoken by an individual describing a relationship.  The integrity of the lines, then, is in that reality.  It is what makes them resonate, engage, and connect with the reader.  But they were spoken in the reality of the speaker to accomplish his ends.  Now they will be reconstituted in a different reality to accomplish some other ends.  This reconstitution is unavoidable if they are to be used at all.  The question is how far can they be taken without corrupting that integrity and being exploitive.  For the ethnographer, the answer is not far at all.  I’m not sure I know the answer for our exemplar cases.  
	Finally we have two categories—each with two levels--of utilization to consider.  First, there is the utilization by the instructor:  an individual under contract to produce certain work for an institution in the construction and performance of an authorized course.  This is the didactics of utilization.  That instructor may or may not be a teacher: an individual who adopts strategies and tactics that guide others to a selected level of performance mastery.  This is the pedagogics of utilization.  Second, there is the utilization by the student: an individual enrolled in a contractual relationship that exchanges value—principally tuition--for value—principally credit in the construction and performance of an authorized class.  This is the mathesics of utilization.  That student may or may not be a learner: an individual who adopts strategies and tactics to achieve a selected level of performance mastery.  This is the philologics of utilization.
	It is crucial to make these four distinctions: instructor, teacher, student, learner as the character and value of the learning object changes in each.  We know a lot, for example, about how to construct a competent lecture as an instructional text.  We know a lot less about how to apply the instructional text in a teaching strategy.  The difference is how to competently fill class periods and how to lead others to competence.  
	Similarly, students know a lot about taking a course, but may have little knowledge of how to adopt or, indeed, little interest in adopting the implicative changes in perspective and action that learning induces.  The difference is the resources to pass a test in science and those needed to be a scientist.  
	For the instructor a learning object may be no more than an element of an instructional text deemed competent by the institution.  For the teacher, the learning object must have strategic or tactical value.  For the student, the learning object may be evaluated only for its importance in achieving a desired grade.  For the learner, the learning object is a resource for a different life. 
Mediation of Learning
	Our classrooms are purposeful, bounded social spaces that constrain semiosis and limit interpretation though the deliberate selection of discursive and symbolic forms, the use of paradigmatic relationships between hierarchically located subject positions, the performance of social routines of hermeneutic supervision, and the instantiation of judicial practices of control.  (My thanks to cultural studies for that sentence.)  These processes are required if the instructor wants to be able to take inherently volatile signs and form them into a question with a single right answer.  
	Return with me to our circular forms to consider Figure Seven
                            Figure Seven
The message of Figure Seven (as I attempt to control your interpretation of it) is that human knowledge is not a unity but discontinuous chunks more or less connected to the process of their creation.  The center that we perceive is not secure in any way but is continuously under political negotiation.  What one learns depends on where, when, and from whom as well as how and why one learns it.  This circumstance is precisely why our classrooms are purposeful, bounded spaces of constraint.  
	The image that one could take of a learning object from Wiley’s definition is that of a free radical coursing through the structurated stream of instruction wreaking hermeneutic havoc.  It would have to be controlled with a heavy dose of conventionalization, both in the classroom and across the supervisory unit in charge of instruction.  We will not, and cannot as instructors, allow our students to draw their own conclusions.  For, as Greimas (1990) points out, every conclusion is perfect according to the time, place, conditions, and circumstance of its construction.  The institutional agent immediately takes exception.  Students will draw our conclusions, so that we can maintain ourselves as instructors.
	I understand that all of this sound incredibly suppressive and it is.  Knowledge appears only in the discipline of its domain.  That discipline has to create the conditions of its validity and repel all competitors to its claims.  It has to provide the terms of right interpretation and good practice.  A learning object will not by itself mediate learning because learning occurs only inside a discipline of understanding.  It is this requirement for learning that accounts for the classroom’s continued existence despite the several centuries of the book and the last 100 years of technological advancement.  We do not trust the autodidact.  They do not play well with others.  
	Playing well with others raises my final point.  The language that surrounds the excitement of learning objects is filled with individualism.  The individual learner is celebrated; individual strategies of knowledge acquisition are underscored; learner-centrism looks to everyone having their own personal set of learning objects.  This discourse reifies knowledge itself as a object--one with material-like boundaries and stable structure that can be acquired, stored, distributed.  
	Contemporary epistemology sees knowledge as a set of community practices that are established, sustained, and advanced through social action.  The peculiar success of the human species has not been its individuality but its sodality.  The grand signs systems of language and action on which our species has advanced are  not individual inventions.  The mind is a social product.  Knowledge becomes knowledge through social process.  In right order, objects become learning objects in the social processes of teaching and learning not through any intrinsic characteristics of their own.  And people become learned not on the basis of their private storehouse of knowledge, but on their ability to competently perform as a member of an intellectual community.  It is only then that teaching and learning reaches its payoff.  
	I believe that the licensing of intellectual property in smaller and smaller units is both a technological and economic imperative.  Technology and the market are converging to one of those flash points where ten years from now, the textbook will be an anachronistic emblem of the highly specialized or affected.  The danger lurking is that the automation of instruction, particularly at the lower levels, will develop so quickly as to outstrip the concurrent development of teaching and learning.  The market for the latter is much less dynamic, is much lower in its initial impact, requires a higher level of investment and has a slower rate of return, but in the end teaching and learning--learning and teaching—that conjoint pair must be what it is all about.  
Implications and Conclusions
	Knowledge is not the product of the great mind thinking well.  There is no thinking outside of social interaction because there is no accessible mind outside the social processes of a disciplined sign usage.  To know is to belong to a communal process of knowing.  
	A student is given a set of hyperlinks—an index of learning objects.  S/he clicks on one of them; a unit of symbolic material appears.  “What does it mean?” s/he asks.  What does s/he mean when s/he asks that question?  s/he means at least the following:  What are physiological requirements of engagement?  What is required of the instruments of sentience and semiosis?  What perceptual resources does the material provide?  What is the perceptual context?  From what perceptual frame am I perceiving?  What valences are in play?  What is relevant, activated?  What interpretive strategies do I have for understanding this signifying material?  What is my interpretive frame?  What resources do I have:  Can I give it a name; classify it; connect it to something else?  What experience have I had with it?  What analogies can I draw from experience?  How is it coherent with what else I know?  What permissions do I have to conduct the interpretation?  What are my freedoms? How much risk can I entail?  What are the conditions of autonomy?  What controls are in place?  What motives are in play?  What is my commitment to the interpretive work, the interpretation?  What are the immediate, durable, local, global, instrumentalities of the interpretation?  What is the social context of understanding?  How do I know when I know?  Who or what will tell me?  What social contracts are in play?  What is my standpoint of engagement?  What is my subject position in the on-going power-relations entailed by this interpretation?  What are the terms of the correct interpretation?  Who controls those terms?  Who or what will tell me right from wrong?  Finally, what form is the interpretation to have?  Into what genre does it fall?  What conventions will govern its formulation?  How will the interpretation be made public?​[2]​  What will be the terms of the exchange?  
	The achievement of meaning, and therefore of knowing, moves through all of these processes which can be labeled starting from the most local (individual) and moving to the most global (social) as sentience (interactability with an environment), semiosis (recognition of signs) engagement (intentional focus) perception (use of sign and cultural systems of meaning) interpretation (naming, classifying, drawing implications) integration (connecting, building coherence), formulation (creating the exchangeable object), exchange (putting meaning into action).  Figure Eight gives a graphical representation of the process. 
                   Figure Eight
This is an impossibly complex and difficult list to consider in any sort of knowledge building activity.  We manage the complexity by institutionalizing many of our answers through the organizational structures of instruction and research.  Eliminating those structures does not liberate knowledge workers (teachers, learners, scholars).  It tremendously increases their burden of work.  Now, they not only have to make sense of things; they have to make sense of the sense-making as well.  
	Much of the work that goes on in our epistemological quadrants is directed toward providing and maintaining the resources of this sense-making.  An individual faced with a knowledge object that is outside of those resources will encounter difficulties very early in the process.  S/he will not have the semiotic resources to form an adequate intentional engagement.  Perceptions will be poorly formed and interpretation may be limited to “This is something I do not and cannot know.”  Exposure does not broaden understanding nor is it the first step of understanding something new.  The skills and strategies of engaging something new must be in place first. 
	The excitement of learning objects is not that we can now efficiently develop, classify, and distribute little bits of content.  That is pretty ordinary didactics.  The excitement is in developing the epistemological, pedagogical, and philological resources and strategies by which we can span the quadrants.  Unless we do that, learning objects will not cross those boundaries (except in the acts of increasing semiotic violence of poaching, appropriation, and excorporation).  That we develop only intra-disciplinary libraries of learning objects is not a bad thing.  It is simply so much less than what could be.  
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^1	   This chapter is a recreation of symposium presentation.  It attempts to retain much of the oral character of the original. 
^2	  Private knowledge has no epistemological value per se.  Knowledge has value only when it can be exchanged either symbolically or in action. 
